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standing forests more valuable than just the timber they contain. 
However, REDD+ has become loaded with a great many other 
meanings. The mechanism has changed considerably since 
its original conception to encompass multiple governance 
objectives—from a tool to reduce emissions from land use 
change and forestry to a complex and multifaceted programme, 
redefining human-forest interactions (Astuti and McGregor 
2015; Howson 2017). REDD+, as a market mechanism, is 
variously presented as a cost-efficient option for mitigating 
human-induced climate change, providing development 
assistance to Indonesia’s ‘forest dependent communities’, 
and protecting tropical forest ecosystems (Nielsen 2013; den 
Besten et al. 2014).
REDD+ is becoming understood widely as part of a suite 
of neoliberal resource-valuation tools, which do more to 
promote uneven accumulation of rights to things and extend 
the reach of global capitalism than to providing tools for 
sound ecological management (Brockington and Duffy, 
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Abstract
Due to increasing global demand for palm oil, coal, and timber, Indonesia has become the largest contributor 
of greenhouse gases from primary forest loss in the world. Carbon market mechanisms, like Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+), are being promoted by many elements of 
Indonesia’s government as an effective policy response. The REDD+ programme is designed to enable the 
provision of financial compensations to protect and restore standing forests by making them more valuable 
than the timber they contain. However, the logic of REDD+ constructs people living in and around project 
sites as environmentally destructive and therefore in need of incentivisation to do otherwise. Local people are 
compensated for the ‘opportunity costs’ of not degrading forests. Within this frame ‘locals’—suffering from 
the malaise of dispossession—are Othered as illegal loggers, poachers, greedy miners or arsonists. In reality, 
REDD+ often facilitates the continuation of violence, legitimising an image of small-holders, rather than large 
international corporations, as the cause of forest degradation in Indonesia. Focusing on the Sungai Lamandau 
REDD+ project of Central Kalimantan, I discuss how, for some of Sungai Lamandau’s landless farmers, 
REDD+ is accelerating the very violence and environmentally destructive behaviours it claims to discourage. 
Farmers are becoming embroiled in other ongoing processes, pushing them towards illicit livelihood strategies, 
sometimes with devastating outcomes.
Keywords: REDD+, neoliberal conservation, intimacy-geopolitics, violence, exclusion, Indonesia
Access this article online
Quick Response Code:
Website: 
www.conservationandsociety.org
DOI:   
10.4103/cs.cs_16_150
Copyright: © Howson 2018. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted 
use and distribution of the article, provided the original work is cited. Published by Wolters Kluwer - Medknow, Mumbai | Managed by the Ashoka Trust for 
Research in Ecology and the Environment (ATREE), Bangalore. For reprints contact: reprints@medknow.com
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia remains the largest contributor of greenhouse gases 
from land use change and forest degradation in the world1. 
Every year, 840,000 ha of primary forest is removed in 
Indonesia (Margono et al. 2014). As a global policy response, 
the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD+) mechanism is growing in significance, 
providing economic incentives for forest protection to make 
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2010; Büscher et al 2012; Matulis 2014). As well as being 
starkly disingenuous, I argue that these modes of neoliberal 
environmentalism can be profoundly violent. As Tyner (2016) 
observes, the market logics of neoliberalism is determinant of 
a pervasive indifference to life, whereby some individuals are 
let die because they fail to conform to the dictates of capital 
accumulation. Such a biopolitical perspective lays out the 
forms of life that environmentalists should support through 
market-based interventions and the others which may be either 
directly or circuitously sacrificed (Nel 2015a). 
For REDD+ to work there remains a necessity for projects 
to at least appear just and equitable for local ‘forest dependent 
communities’ (Di Gregorio et al. 2013). For this purpose, 
REDD+ projects are legitimised by roping the ‘poor’, the 
‘local community’ together for the sake of equivalence and 
commensurability, often painting them as illicit actors in 
need of incentivising to do as they ought. The workings of 
REDD+ in Indonesia are wrapped up in all sorts of good 
things, including forest protection, community empowerment, 
and economic development—the desire to intervene in 
other people’s lives and make them better (Hall 2013). 
Not surprisingly then, aside from a few exceptional cases 
(e.g., Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014; Nel 2015b), processes 
of enclosing forests for carbon rarely necessitate the use of 
direct corporeal harm to the bodies of those affected. However, 
the violent exclusions from REDD+ forests addressed in this 
paper are of an implicit kind—hidden away in market-based 
regulation of land and private property. By focussing on these 
many forms of hidden violence occurring through REDD+ 
interventions, the paper understands the push for REDD+ in 
Indonesia as an intimate ‘war by other means’ (Duffield 2007). 
Despite lacking bloodshed, the multiform plurality of violence 
explored here are in some respects much more insidious. They 
take on a legitimate mask. With their associated structures of 
discrimination and oppression, they concretise the rightness 
of capital interests while doing very little to alleviate the 
environmentally destructive excesses of those same interests.
To draw attention to these hidden forms of violence, 
the paper adopts a feminist-inspired intimacy-geopolitics 
approach to an analysis of REDD+. This analysis highlights 
the connections and relations between intimate actors and 
actions with what is often considered geopolitical. Such an 
approach attempts to dissolve the customary boundaries 
between the global and the local, the family and state, and the 
personal and political as objects of study (Pain and Staeheli 
2014). ‘Intimacy’ is understood here not only as elements of 
life taking place at close range, spatially and socially restricted 
to a person and a few tight-knit connections. Instead, the 
paper argues that the geopolitical is never separate from that 
which is intimate. This conceptualisation considers intimacy 
through sets of multiple intersecting relations, connecting 
the bodies of people in Sungai Lamandau with others more 
distant from them. Violence is a key theme for intimacy-
geopolitics (Williams and Massaro 2013; Pain and Staeheli 
2014). The paper therefore understands violence as operating 
through emotional and psychological processes as a means of 
wielding control. Violence, through the intimacy-geopolitics 
frame, is therefore linked to wider social norms, obligations, 
and customs, and to economic relations (Hays-Mitchell 2005). 
These forms of violence are often understood as explicitly or 
implicitly sanctioned by states (Springer 2011) and institutions 
(Fletcher This issue). In this way, violence plays a fundamental 
role within systems of oppression and the insecurities that 
disproportionately affect those excluded (Koopman 2011).
The empirical exploration of violence is informed by the 
Sungai Lamandau REDD+ project in Central Kalimantan, one 
from a portfolio of four REDD+ projects being supported by the 
Clinton Climate Initiative’s (CCI) Forestry program (between 
2008 and 2013). Through this exploration, I argue that the 
REDD+ project is far from simply a defender of forest spaces, 
but constitutes an offensive position, whereby conservation 
is, for some, an intervening aggressor used to keep things as 
they are (Duffy 2014). In order to make sense of this offensive 
position, I do not attempt to police a strict definition of violence 
here. However, I do adopt a conceptualisation that makes use 
of violence’s slippery character. In doing so, the paper argues 
that limiting a definition of violence to that which is explicitly 
obvious within any framing of ‘green wars’ neglects injustices 
rooted in the enabling and all too often hidden structures of 
violence.
The following section explains the slippery conceptualisation 
of violence in more detail .  I  then introduce the 
intimacy-geopolitics lens used for looking at violence in 
everyday places. The complex political ecology of the project 
site as well as the ‘community-based’ model of REDD+ 
as manifested in Sungai Lamandau is then explored. The 
penultimate section investigates how everyday market-based 
interactions tied up in the REDD+ project’s development and 
conservation goals constitute the arsenal for a hidden ‘green 
war’—exposing the violent exclusions from the REDD+ 
project as they were mobilised by the project’s diverse array 
of actors. These discussions inform the paper’s conclusions.
SLIPPERY VIOLENCE
When understood as ‘slippery’, violence is not an ontological 
category. Acts described as violent are always historically 
and geographically contingent and dialectically related to the 
society from which they emerge (Tyner 2015). By adopting a 
broader view of violence that places acts in their geographical 
and historical context, certain violence in the form of 
transgressions of conservation and development interests, for 
example, become more understandable (Duffy 2014).
When enclosing forests for REDD+, exclusions form 
part of an inevitable trade-off to securing conservation 
and development interests, which are often considered 
more legitimate than those involving resource extraction. 
Violence thus becomes a matter of law and property rights. 
Whether realised or implied, physical violence is important 
to the legitimation, regulation, and market-based operation 
of all property concerns and their legal basis of existence 
(Hall et al. 2011). Proudhon (1840) contrasted the sovereign 
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right of ‘property’—viewed as an affront to the liberty, equality, 
and security of the community—with ‘possession’, which 
cannot be mobilised for exploitation as it is based on actual 
use. Property is thus defined by its mechanism of exploitation, 
which makes it fundamentally different from possession 
insofar as it relies on coercion, exclusion, hierarchy, and most 
notably, force (or law) to maintain its viability (Springer 2015).
Baird (2014) argues that in legitimising the ‘rightness of 
property’ and servicing the green economy’s land requirements, 
memories of formalised exclusions are particularly relevant. 
He also stresses, in relation to various large-scale plantations, 
mining, and hydropower dam concessions, the importance of 
political memories in (re)shaping understandings of particular 
varieties of memory-laden political landscapes. However, 
these memories within landscapes are rarely uniformly shared 
by all. For example, years of dictatorial rule in Indonesia are 
often remembered for their hardships, or occasionally with 
fondness for their stability and assertive leadership. Memory 
and politics shift enclosures from a violent to a legitimate 
truth. Furthermore, shared understandings of past events shape 
perceptions concerning what is right, possible or pragmatic 
today, especially when the rightness of property remains 
contested.
Benjamin (1921) in his Critique of Violence, explored a 
general tendency to obscure violence in institutionalised forms 
of private property. There are also inclinations to exclusively 
regard violence as something one can perceive only through 
its direct bodily effects. Benjamin used the idea of ‘divine 
violence’ in order to designate ‘an Act’—a brutal disruption, 
which exists external to any law. This can be contrasted with 
‘mythic violence’, which is a means of establishing the rules 
of law, or the legal social order. Arendt (1963) exemplified 
mythic violence in a recount of how the Nazi officer, Adolf 
Eichmann defended himself during his trials in Israel, by 
appealing to Kantian duty for his part in the ‘Final Solution’. 
Arendt (1963) called this the embodiment of the banality of 
evil. From this perspective, one does not need to be fanatical, 
sadistic, or mentally ill to murder millions; it is enough to be a 
loyal follower eager to do one’s duty from a desk (Levy 2006).
Rooted in Lacan’s (1977) triptych of psychoanalytic theory, 
Žižek (2008) distinguishes blood-spilling ‘subjective violence’ 
from its ‘objective’ counterpoint. Subjective violence is, 
according to Žižek, the perceptibly obvious violence seen on 
the news or on the streets in the form of crime and ‘terror’, 
civil unrest or international conflict. This is the most visible 
portion of the violence spectrum. ‘Objective violence’ is the 
‘unengageable’ processes of violence that take the shape 
of either the symbolic (bound up in language and its forms 
[Bourdieu 2001; Jiwani 2006]) or the structural (e.g., the 
catastrophic consequences of the global market economy 
when it is functioning normally [Galtung 1969; Farmer 2004]). 
Structural and symbolic violence are at the slippery core of 
this discussion. As Žižek (2008:2) suggests, these forms of 
violence “may be invisible, but [they have] to be taken into 
account if one is to make sense of what might otherwise seem 
to be ‘irrational’ explosions of subjective violence”.
When violence concerns only the direct, corporeal offences 
to a person(s), one runs the risk of relegating violence to 
irrationality. Springer (2011) argues that all violence is rational. 
Where violence is ever explained away as ‘irrational’, Springer 
argues that this is a colonial ascription applied to cultures or 
individuals in an attempt to mark them as ‘Other’. When one 
acknowledges violence, what one sees is not a ‘thing’, but a 
moment with a past, present, and future that is determined by its 
relations with other moments of social process (Springer 2012). 
The material Act of violence itself is merely the Real (in the 
Lacanian sense) nodal point, a snapshot of oppressive social 
relations. On its own the ‘act’ does not mean very much. 
The missing imaginary and symbolic elements are what 
make the Real Act profoundly unjust, humiliating, painful or 
emancipatory.
Resistance, according to Žižek (2008), may constitute 
emancipatory violence2. However, there needs to be a clear 
differentiation between acts that are an authentic and violent 
break that challenge the morality of a neo-liberal symbolic 
order, and those that work to perpetuate that order. Badiou 
(2012) has argued that the neoliberal ‘market-society’, although 
by virtue of being ‘global’—it appears to encompass the whole 
world—sustains a ‘worldless’ ideological constellation in 
which people are deprived of their ways of locating meaning. 
Often within carbon forestry discourses, subjectively violent 
reactions to the market-society’s worldlessness work to 
reinforce the primacy of the market, both by ingraining 
limitations within subjects of any potential alternative to the 
market-society and by acting as a kind of ‘pseudo-violence’, 
legitimising the market-based symbolic order. By using a 
slippery conceptualisation of violence one can take account 
of violence’s emancipatory potential and draw attention to 
the vulnerable bodies of those at the sharp end of REDD+ 
interventions. As Vaneigem (1967 [1994]: 163) puts it, “so 
long as we have not managed to abolish any of the causes of 
human despair we have no right to try and abolish the means 
whereby men [sic] attempt to get rid of despair”.
INTIMACY-GEOPOLITICS AND VIOLENCE
The geopolitical scalar categorisations, dominant in much of 
REDD+ literature, are highly problematic. Lindhjem et al. 
(2010) characterise two forms of REDD+ benefit accrual—the 
first involves sharing benefits among global, national, and local 
level actors; the second among communities, households, and 
other local actors. These scalar formations, suggesting that sites 
of carbon commodity production are fundamentally separate 
from where they are theoretically traded, serve to justify an 
apparent impracticality to distribute benefits equitably. These 
categories also disguise messy and inequitable webs of power, 
drawing them instead as well-ordered production lines along 
which people receive what they deserve (Howson 2017).
A feminist-inspired geopolitical lens redresses the usual 
emphasis on the geopolitical as primary in negotiations of 
REDD+ in places. It refocuses attention on the seemingly 
apolitical, ‘mundane’, everyday reproductions of geopolitical 
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power and violence. In much geographical analysis, violence 
has been separated out, positioned either as local or everyday, 
or as objects of international or political conflict (Dalby 
2008). Intimacy-geopolitics, as I use it here, unpicks and 
draws connections across different forms of violence and 
insecurity. The approach enables an understanding of how 
violent exclusions mediate intimate processes that traverse the 
conventional scales of REDD+ implementation—‘national, 
sub-national and local’ (Angelsen et al. 2012). These intimate 
processes include friendships, fears, shared histories/memories, 
and spaces of interaction. ‘Intimacy’ therefore represents more 
than just the relationship between neighbours and kin, or that 
which was spatially proximate.
Pain and Staeheli (2014) suggest that intimacy consists 
of three intersecting sets of relations, which work 
simultaneously rather than separately. First, intimacy is 
understood as a set of spatial relations, stretching from 
proximate to distant. In this regard, my analysis, like much 
feminist research, emphasises the body as the primary unit 
of analysis. Second, intimacy is understood as a mode of 
interaction that stretches from personal to distant—e.g., how 
emotions, fears, and knowledges affect how subjects resist 
and shape wider power relations and formalised systems 
of REDD+ operation. Third, intimacy involves a set of 
practices, again applying to, but also connecting the body 
and that which is distant; e.g., livelihood strategies in Sungai 
Lamandau often traversed the interpersonal, institutional, 
and national realms.
Besides a few exceptions, according to Pain (2015), 
political geographers have had little to say about domestic 
or everyday violence. This is surprising within a discipline 
with a core interest in how spaces, places, and scales produce 
and reproduce a range of social and political phenomena. 
Attention towards militarised and violent green wars are of 
course warranted. When this attention fails to understand the 
green war as inseparable from the politics and experiences of 
everyday life, the violence becomes situated as different and 
distant (Sjoberg 2013). The geopolitical violence in question 
relies on more pervasive, intimate forms of slippery violence. 
Both are similarly located, they work through emotions, and 
there is always some enactment of resistance (Pain 2015).
When meanings associated with forest protection 
and social justice become understood only through a 
geopolitical, economistic lens, using mechanisms such 
as ‘informed consent’ (see Corbera and Schroeder 
2011), where equity or justice becomes ‘benefit-sharing’ 
(see Di Gregorio et al. 2013), where nature becomes 
‘natural capital’ (see Juniper 2012), and social protection 
is understood through a collection of ‘safe-guards’ 
(see Jagger et al. 2009), the results reify an economistic 
reality. A critical analysis of REDD+ should be framed 
so as to escape the economistic representations which 
place imaginations of forest conservation within a 
discursive cul-de-sac of neoliberal environmentalism. An 
intimacy-geopolitics, I suggest, offers one way to do this.
THE CONTEXT OF REDD+ IN SUNGAI LAMANDAU
As the Sungai Lamandau project was the first ‘community-based’ 
(Hutan Kemasyarakatan; HKM) REDD+ related activity in 
Indonesia, it is a good case through which to explore processes 
of violent exclusion occurring within intimate settings. A 
consortium of NGOs in partnership with the local West 
Kotawaringin (KoBar) government proposed the project in 
2010. The project was initially funded with a CCI grant, with 
sustainable funding proposed through the sale of produced 
REDD+ Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). The proposed 
site constituted a ‘buffer zone’—a restricted area bordering 
the Sungai Lamandau wildlife reserve. Within the buffer 
zone, extractive activities, fires, and the felling of trees was 
prohibited and closely monitored by local government officials 
through a series of guard posts (Figure 1).
At the time of conducting this study, the Sungai Lamandau 
demonstration activity is the only REDD+ initiative in 
Indonesia where a community cooperative is listed as the 
official ‘Proponent’ on the Project Design Document (PDD). 
In March 2011, 10 cooperatives, with members from villages 
across the KoBar district, formed a legally-recognised union 
known as Pelangi KoBar Bersatu—The United Rainbow 
of KoBar (PKB). The aim of the project was to formalise 
existing community groups into legally recognised farmers’ 
cooperatives, which Yayorin (Indonesian Orangutan 
Foundation), a small conservation NGO, had facilitated locally 
since 1991. An alternative sustainable livelihoods programme 
for the cooperatives was implemented, involving the revival 
of traditional land management practices, including native 
rubber (jelutung), rice, and rattan. In order to become a member 
of any of the cooperatives, one had to prove a livelihood 
connection and be a registered citizen of KoBar. Participating 
farmers’ cooperatives were expected to establish at least one 
communally-managed enterprise, which would in principle, 
provide members with greater economic security, a source of 
credit, or a means of capital to establish other enterprises in 
the future. 
Empirical analysis of local people’s responses to the 
conservation and development measures derives from nine 
months of ethnographic fieldwork, which I conducted in 
Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, in 2013. Much of the research 
involved semi-structured interviews and observations 
within three groups. These included: 1) the Mendawai of 
Pendulangan—indigenous Muslims (sometimes known 
generically as ‘Malay’), 2) a Javanese transmigrant community 
located within a rice farming settlement between Kumpai Batu 
Atas and Tanjung Terantang, and 3) an ethnic Malay Banjarese 
native jelutung rubber tapping group located in the Sei Gandis 
settlement. In each village and sub-village, the administrative 
head (Kepala Desa/Kedes), leaders, members, and affiliates 
of local farmers’ groups and women’s groups, and a sample 
of 15–40 individual households participated in the study. The 
material generated through observation was supplemented by 
formal and informal discussions with the project implementers, 
CCI and Yayorin, heads of local corporations, associated NGO 
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staff members and volunteers, as well as local and provincial 
civil servants. All this data enabled a nuanced understanding of 
the relations, interactions, and practices of Sungai Lamandau’s 
intimate green war.
The following section will use an intimacy-geopolitics 
approach to explore the slippery violence occurring as REDD+ 
played out in Sungai Lamandau. The violence traversed scales 
and sites of implementation, underpinning how they worked. 
The diffusion of geopolitical violence was achieved through 
their presence in the everyday, manifesting as a series of 
intimate exclusions. The discussion is divided into four parts, 
examining how violent exclusions were instituted, regulated, 
and legitimised through the REDD+ project’s conservation and 
development goals. These goals included, 1) the promotion 
of market enterprise, 2) the development of ‘sustainable’ 
alternative livelihoods, 3) the enclosure of spaces for forest 
ecosystem restoration, and 4) incentivising pro-environmental 
behaviour. Within each, I highlight how structural violence(s) 
worked through everyday processes—they were similarly 
located, they worked through emotions and memory, and there 
was always enactment of resistance.
SLIPPERY VIOLENCE IN REDD+ FORESTS
Violence, market enterprise, and REDD+
REDD+ development interventions are said to require an 
enabling business environment for improving the quality of life 
for ‘forest-dependent people’ by generating alternative sources 
of income and employment (Tomaselli and Hajjar 2011). 
Dependence is understood as a debilitating scourge, while 
its opposites—independence, autonomy, and freedom—are 
unproblematic (Ferguson 2013; Li 2013). The evidence from 
Sungai Lamandau reveals problems with this assertion. The 
formation of REDD+ project enterprises requires the merging 
of two opposing logics. The first suggests that promoting 
local entrepreneurship, income generation schemes, and 
small-businesses, will lead to socio-economic empowerment 
for marginalised groups. The second suggests that local 
small-holders are incompatible victims of global capitalist 
processes intruding from the outside, and should therefore be 
protected from capitalism by managing their lands in common. 
As Yoshi, a Yayorin staff member once explained to me:
 [Some farmers] do not understand money. When they 
get it they spend it on silly things. They get themselves 
into trouble sometimes. It’s crazy. They’re like children. 
We gave out transport money at a project visit once. We 
had people asking for IDR 10.000 instead of IDR 50.000, 
because they want the red note, not the blue one, and they 
could buy cigarettes with the red ones.
Put together, the incompatible logics form what Davis 
(2006: 181) calls the “micro-capitalism” of the poor—walled 
economies, protected from the alluring viciousness of capitalism 
in its global form. Yet, the REDD+ project’s proposed small-scale 
capitalism described through terms such as ‘independence’ 
and ‘local entrepreneurship’ ignores the micro-processes of 
dispossession that such a capitalism generates.
Figure 1 
Map of the Sungai Lamandau study area, including REDD+ project site 
Source: Adapted from Howson 2017
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The push to enable an adequate business environment around 
Sungai Lamandau’s local commodity markets of rubber, rice, 
and rattan, was an important mediator of REDD+ benefits 
(Howson and Kindon 2015). The push was also a cause of 
structural violence, excluding already marginalised farmers 
and labourers from project benefits. For example, some 
REDD+ cooperatives offered options of loans to small-holders 
and landless labourers. Many used the loans as modal 
(start-up capital) to fund small business ventures, others used 
it to weather a crisis, buy food or cover school fees. Where 
debtors became over-extended, they were often forced to turn 
to illicit and environmentally-destructive repayment options. 
Agung, a member of the all-male Tani Sejati group, explained 
the situation like this:
 Rice harvests fail at least once every three tries. The soil 
isn’t right for it. We’re forbidden from burning the fields 
like we used to, so we have to buy chemicals. […] When 
there’s no rice to harvest, people borrow from each other 
from the arisan [rotating communal savings and loans 
schemes]. If people can’t pay it back they take timber and 
look for gold or something inside the reserve. […] It’s 
dangerous yes, but people have to eat (19 June 2013).
Unlike landed cooperative members, the landless lacked 
the means to invest in private business ventures or speculate 
on carbon markets, which they did not understand well. 
They were, instead, compelled into debt. For most labourers, 
excluded from REDD+ activities, mute docility was their 
response, fuelled through a desire to prosper. This tolerance 
for inequality and structural violence was usually (but not 
always) brought about through an internalising rationalisation. 
They displayed a spirit of ‘belum’ (not yet) rather than ‘tidak 
pernah’ (not ever). For landless farmers, this came with some 
violent environmental impacts. As Fathir, a male resident of 
Kumpai Batu Bawa explained:
 Some people have no land. They have to sell it all, bit by 
bit, to pay off debts. They have nowhere to grow anything. 
For me, I cleared the forest at the back of my house. Noone 
was using it, just the chickens. […] I still had to keep it 
quiet. You go to jail for clearing trees. Even the pylons 
are made of metal now you see? There’s not even enough 
trees left to make pylons (4 October 2013).
The deforestation described here was a hidden form of 
violence countering the exclusionary dynamics forcing Fathir 
out of the REDD+ project. The act also worked to undermine 
a central objective of the REDD+ project—to protect Sungai 
Lamandau’s forests. However, although the REDD+ project 
did not overtly dispossess people or enclose land formally 
held in common in Sungai Lamandau, it did rely on the same 
instruments of market-based force, creating market subjects 
through a rightness of property.
For jelutung rubber tappers in Sungai Lamandau, access to 
land was mediated less by property rights, but by other bundles 
of powers (Howson and Kindon 2015). The REDD+ project 
brought an opportunity for rubber tappers who maintained 
these access qualifications to form collectives and resist the 
power of middlemen to set arbitrary hikes in commodity 
market prices. Prior to the REDD+ project, rubber tappers 
in Pendulangan and Tanjung Puteri worked independently of 
one another and sold their raw product to middlemen in the 
market centres of Mendawai and Sampit. Prices fluctuated 
daily. Utami, a member of the all-male Sepakat group told 
me in one interview:
 I used to sell my pantung (raw rubber) at the docks in 
Sampit, because the market prices were higher there and 
my brother worked for the KORINDO [saw mill] on the 
boats, so he took it there for me. […] Sometimes I wouldn’t 
get more than IDR 4,000 a kilo selling it to middlemen, so 
I would make a loss. We don’t have anything to do with 
[middlemen] now. They’re all swindlers. They drove nice 
new cars while sometimes I couldn’t even afford an ojek 
(motor bike taxi) to return home (25 July 2013).
The formation of the REDD+ enterprise in Pendulangan 
allowed the group to reshape the exclusionary market regime 
and assert their own powers to exclude. This formation enabled 
a resistance to violent market exclusions achieved through 
the same market rationale. However, for rubber tappers who 
could not maintain the necessary access qualifications, their 
outlook was very different. Rahmat, a local forestry officer 
described the situation:
 To conserve and manage the forest effectively there is 
now a 33 member maximum [limit] allowed to enter the 
forest for rubber. We are trying to wean them off using the 
protected areas and the buffer zone by using the permit 
system and we work with PolHut to enforce the rules. […] 
With the entry permits, they are valid for just six months. 
They can’t be handed down to children and they have to 
be renewed by the cooperative leaders. So the numbers 
of forest users will always decrease. […] Yes there’s 
resistance, because there are few alternatives for them. 
(25 September 2013).
The act of unifying to improve market access only supported 
those who could access a REDD+ enterprise. The market-based 
symbolic order of competition and exclusion was peacefully 
normalised and reinforced, rather than transcended. After all, 
any capitalism is an assemblage of elements, practices, and 
processes with a history of violence and struggle. “We cannot 
tame it by building walls or wishing it away” (Li 2010: 400). 
In this instance, the issues engendered in systems of private 
property were solved, temporarily for some, yet perpetuated 
for others through systems of private property. The market’s 
violence was simply moved around.
Violence and ‘sustainable alternative livelihoods’
The REDD+ project was attempting to link income 
generation (especially for the rural poor) with conservation 
objectives—a process commonly referred to as Integrated 
Conservation and Development (ICD). This approach, 
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according to CIFOR (2000: vi), accepts an understanding 
that, “a community and its members (potential entrepreneurs) 
will conserve and protect forest resources, if it receives the 
economic benefits from sustainable forest use”. For the 
REDD+ project in Sungai Lamandau, the application of such 
an approach assumes that it is the forest residents, rather 
than large multinational corporations, who are responsible 
for forest degradation with the challenge being to create 
‘alternative livelihoods’ and make sustainable forest uses 
more profitable for the rural poor. As Yayorin programme 
volunteer, Budiarto explained:
 The people here, who have come from Java, they moved 
here to work in the forest for the timber. Most of the timber 
mills are closed because all the big trees are gone. Now 
we have to change their minds about forests as just timber. 
We need to help them find prosperity outside the forests 
with non-timber forest products (14 July 2013).
The term non-timber forest products (‘NTFPs’) appears to 
be a politically neutral reference to specific forest outputs, 
yet the regulation of what constitutes ‘sustainable alternative 
livelihoods’ and the promotion of NTFPs is profoundly violent. 
As discussed by Dove (2011), NTFPs are highly politicised 
on two assumptions—the first is that they are resources local 
people may be permitted to exploit, and the second is that 
no one but local people would want to exploit them, leaving 
powerful actors to seek out more lucrative forest-based 
resources, or the same resources on a more profitable scale. 
The rhetorical constraints in the concept of NTFPs are reflected 
through their absence in the context of lucrative commercial 
resources. For example, there was no reason to consider the 
gold within Sungai Lamandau’s forests as anything other than 
NTFPs, yet access to the REDD+ project site for purposes of 
artisanal gold mining was strictly forbidden.
Access to the forests for fishing was also forbidden for 
anyone without an official permit. However, through the 
REDD+ project, cooperatives were offered sustainable 
alternative livelihood training in aquaculture. Again, this 
was considered with limited sympathy for landless fishermen 
dispossessed by the REDD+ project enclosure. Instead, 
beneficiaries included those with the necessary collateral to 
take part—the landed, all-male, transmigrant rice farming 
cooperatives of Terantang. 
The structural violence engendered within promoting 
sustainable alternative livelihoods was nowhere more obvious 
than within the only two women’s groups of Wanita Mandiri 
and Cabe Rawat. None of the women had received training 
in aquaculture or had access to the REDD+ site for exploiting 
‘NTFPs’. However, almost all had husbands or close male 
family members in other REDD+ cooperatives that had. The 
leader of Wanita Mandiri told me:
 We work to support our husbands. They have the livelihood 
in the forests, not us. So we don’t get the land to plant 
anything or cut trees, just our husbands’ groups get that 
(5 October 2013).
The all-female groups worked as kelompok suport 
(support workers)—preparing tree saplings in polythene 
sacks or meals for visiting carbon consultants or development 
workers. Women were being included in the project, yet 
the construction of sustainable alternative livelihoods was 
working to concretise the prevailing essentialist dichotomies 
of masculinity and femininity. Women’s work would legitimise 
the project’s inclusive aims, but property and access to land 
would stay under the men’s control. Men were assumed to be 
the workers of the household and on that basis were perceived 
as the families’ destructive sharp edge. The traditional realm 
of Sungai Lamandau’s women was perceived to be the home. 
Home-industries and assistance with managing the household 
economy was therefore considered the most appropriate 
intervention within the common purview of women’s lives.
Violence and the construction of spaces for forest 
ecosystem restoration
The violent strategies of land acquisition and enclosure for 
conservation were deeply troublesome. As Kelly (2011) 
argues, to understand reserves and national parks as an 
unadulterated and uncomplicated good is misleading as they 
often lead to further enclosures and dispossessions. In Sungai 
Lamandau, the means by which protected areas were created, 
maintained, and commodified through violence were leading 
to increased environmental violence and long-term social 
instability.
Many of the villages responding to the Sungai Lamandau 
project were also responding to a number of other large-scale 
conservation enclosures in the region with similar conservation 
and development goals. These included the Rimba Raya 
REDD+ project, also headquartered in Pangkalanbuun. These 
REDD+ efforts flanked the Tanjung Puting National Park, 
which was facilitated by the same consortium of orangutan 
conservation NGOs. 
The Sei Gandis rubber collective shared a distinct sense of 
historical injustice instituted through these various enclosures 
orchestrated for purposes of orangutan conservation. Sarwono, 
a male Sei Gandis member explained to me:
 Our group used to collect rubber from across the bay from 
Kubu, in the [Tanjung Puting] National Park. When they 
first closed the forests for the orangutans, we could still 
get in. But now we must go up river. It is as if the army 
are there now. […] They would put you in jail if you take 
from the National Park now (1 November 2015).
Though the forest had been set aside by the Dutch colonial 
government in the 1930s, OFI had led a move in the 1980s to 
fully enclose the 400,000 ha site as a National Park. Sei Gandis 
members were prevented from accessing what they saw as 
their customary lands for the purpose of creating a pristine 
environment for wild primates. But, as Münster and Münster 
(2012) argue, the idea of a pristine wilderness disregards 
centuries of human interaction with forests and serves to justify 
‘fortress conservation’ (Brockington et al. 2006).
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In order to ensure lands for the region’s orangutan projects 
were acquired with minimal upset, OFI regularly purchased 
the same privately owned plots two or three times over, from 
different families. Where deeds were held, land neighbouring 
OFI’s reserves could be sold at hugely inflated prices. In 
November 2012, an undeveloped area less than 5,000 sq. m 
had sold for USD 80,000. The boom was sparking a rush for 
vacant land. In Kubu and nearby villages, land with no clear 
ownership attached was often fenced off and offered up for 
sale. It was explained to me by one Kubu villager how a family 
who had used a small plot of land for generations had it sold 
from under them by neighbours holding deeds to it acquired 
through links to political officials. Many villagers who felt 
defrauded by the conservation initiatives had little interest in 
supporting the REDD+ project. As one male rubber tapper 
from Kubu told me:
 Our forests are used for the prosperity of orangutans, but 
what about my prosperity? What about my children’s 
prosperity? It is very clear that they care more for 
orangutans than human beings (18 November 2013). 
When the conservationists deemed it necessary, officers 
from PolHut (Forest Police) were called for suppressing 
dissent. The director of OFI explained: “When things get out 
of hand, and they do [laughs], we call for backup from the riot 
squad. We let [PolHut] sort it out” (8 December, 2013). But, 
for day-to-day policing of the newly instituted land tenure 
arrangements, OFI recruited three sympathetic Kubu villagers 
as political commissars. They were given dark blue uniforms 
and tasked with ensuring that sympathies for OFI’s work 
were disseminated amongst other villagers. The commissars 
included elected officials, so as to ensure maximum influence 
for the enclosure’s conservation and development goals. 
Violence also took the form of forced evictions by forest police, 
from land within the buffer zone and nature reserve. As Adi, a 
Babual Baboti resident, stated in an interview:
 We have always argued that the reserve has been 
established without discussion with us. […] PolHut came 
and removed everyone just like that. […] Now what can 
I do? I have nothing. They can fine me if they like, but I 
can’t pay. I will continue to use the forest like I always 
have” (21 September 2013).
Although the REDD+ project site was intended as a space 
for the forest-dependent peoples’ economic reproduction in 
a sustainable manner, perversely, those without formal title 
to land were often the ones excluded from accessing Sungai 
Lamandau’s forests. As explained by Rizky, a male Kumpai 
Batu Atas resident:
 I don’t have land so I can’t join [the Tani Sejati group]. 
So, I can’t get on the groups’ semaksi [protected area entry 
permit]. And, I can’t enter [the reserve] through the gates, 
even though I have always used the forest. My grandfather 
and I used to hunt together with sumpitan (traditional blow 
pipes). […] We use a friends’ boat to enter from time to 
time. […] It’s very difficult now. […] We have to go at 
night so that we are invisible like ghosts (28 August 2013).
The entry limitations inevitably led to violence inflicted 
on Sungai Lamandau’s forests perpetrated by those 
excluded—those who relied on the forest to make ends meet. 
Yet, under secure conditions, entry and exit to the forest was 
taking place by covert means, without monitoring of resources 
collected. Illicit logging, gold mining and poaching were 
silently undermining the project’s conservation goals.
Violent alterity in incentivising pro-environmental 
behaviour
The principle behind REDD+ project incentives is that they 
serve to reinforce intrinsically motivated pro-forest behaviour 
or induce people to follow the good examples of other 
individuals (Luttrell et al. 2013). The various monetary and 
non-monetary incentives from a REDD+ project are a sort of 
ecological ransom, requiring the payment of an ‘opportunity 
cost’—the minimum amount that would need to be paid to 
forest users not to deforest. This is based on the assumption 
that a rational economic entity would want to benefit at least 
as much as the entity gives up by not deforesting.
As well as inadvertently painting small-holders as illicit 
actors culpable for the destruction of Sungai Lamandau’s 
forests, external incentives were also turning motivations 
of voluntary goodwill into market-like interactions. In these 
new arrangements, ideas of justice and equity were shifting 
from an intrinsic position to being rooted in serviceable 
claims to things. For example, in mid-2010, to initiate the 
REDD+ project’s reforestation effort within the buffer zone, 
cooperatives were provided native jelutung rubber saplings 
as a sustainable livelihood benefit. However, according to 
volunteers, very few of the 1,500 saplings provided were ever 
planted. According to Dumadi, a male rubber tapper from 
Pendulangan:
 We stored the saplings in the guard posts. They were meant 
to be moved to the rubber tapper’s sheds on Sungai Bulu 
and then planted for gotong royong [volunteer work]. Most 
just rotted. […] I found them a few months later. We took 
the polybags off and dumped them. […] It’s a shame we 
don’t have the time. They don’t last long and if we’re busy 
at the weekends, they’re all dead (16 October 2013).
A push to expand the availability of native jelutung was 
perceived unfavourably by many rubber tappers, resulting in 
the series of dissimulative acts. The rubber tappers’ reluctance 
to plant the native species was understandable when contrasted 
with alternative species. Jelutung could only be tapped very 
early in the morning when the air cool. Trees were usually 
located up to a mile apart separated by deep swampland and 
there was no guarantee that once reached on foot, the tree 
would not have been tapped by others. Instead, group members 
preferred the extension of non-native karet rubber species. The 
karet could be planted very close together. A single hectare 
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plantation could sustain a family securely and planting the 
crop on private land meant the owner had exclusive rights to it.
The dream of external project proponents—envisioning 
a restoration of native wilderness maintained by native 
labour—became short lived. There were clear instances 
of what Adas (1986: 64-86) terms ‘avoidance protest’ 
(see also Scott 1985). This kind of violence bypassed open 
dissent or direct confrontation with the project implementers, 
forestry officials or donor bodies. As Hendra, a member of the 
all-male rubber group, Sepakat, told me:
 There’s been two occasions when we have been given 
thousands of saplings. We plant some. But we must leave 
most of them on the floor. […] We are a small group. How 
do they expect us to plant all those trees? […] Besides, we 
don’t own the land. We can’t give the land to our children. 
Those trees are for the orangutans not us. They would do 
better to plant durian; the orangutans would enjoy that 
more (29 November 2013).
This sort of disobedience and lack of commitment to the 
project’s manual labour requirements was interpreted as 
indifference. The local people of Sungai Lamandau were 
symbolically constructed as uncaring ‘Others’—people who 
cared very little about forest and biodiversity conservation, 
a situation requiring external intervention from project 
implementers. An OFUK Director, stated: 
 It’s difficult to say ‘you have to protect the forests 
because you have to look after the orangutan’. It’s not a 
species people warm to. They like stories about tigers and 
elephants; they all know about the Komodo dragon. But 
the orangutan isn’t a species they’re comfortable with. […] 
The majority of people who live here have never been to 
Tanjung Puting [National Park] and they have no interest 
in ever going to Tanjung Puting—no interest in orangutans. 
It’s because of the resemblance to humans maybe or vice 
versa, I don’t know. To get people to conserve forests you 
have to talk about timber and money and poverty, not 
species like orangutans, they don’t care about that. They 
don’t value it—the way we think about the value of the 
forest—in that way (14 June 2013).
Yet in fact, many local people did care about forest 
protection. A group of self-proclaimed ‘aktivis’, in their early 
20s, met weekly at the small outdoor coffee stands erected 
within Pangkalanbuun’s main town centre roundabout to 
discuss opportunities for direct action against palm oil ventures 
encroaching into local forests. One of the activists, Aji, invited 
me to their regular Saturday evening meeting. He arrived with 
printed copies of an article from the Mongabay website—one 
for each of the 10 or so members. Aji was not alone in his 
concern for human rights and environmental issues. Other 
group members shared stories they had come across—featuring 
the US-based palm-oil giant Cargill’s use of child labour on 
its Kalimantan plantations, or local politicians’ affiliations 
with logging firms. But, this image of local people caring a 
great deal about local conservation issues was rarely shared 
by the REDD+ project’s proponents. For them, local people 
remained the cause of forest degradation. Their perceived 
violent character legitimised market-based REDD+ projects, 
but in turn produced a self-perpetuating logic—a cycle of 
violent alterity causing the very degradation REDD+ was 
designed to fix.
CONCLUSIONS
The degradation of Indonesia’s forests is an object of 
global environmental governance constituting the country’s 
largest source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
(Margono et al. 2014). REDD+, as a global policy response, 
focuses on the provision of economic incentives for forest 
protection in Indonesia, striving “to make forests more 
valuable standing than cut down” (Katerere 2010: 105). The 
cornerstone of the REDD+ programme is considerations for 
social equity through systems of sharing costs and benefits 
across multiple scales of implementation. For Angelsen et al. 
(2008: 31–32) scales of REDD+ implementation refer to “the 
accounting levels of an international funding mechanism”. 
Within such a construction, various REDD+ benefits can be 
distributed using a ‘subnational approach’. REDD+ activities 
can be implemented in a defined geographical area with 
‘communities’ incentivised to protect forests through a system 
of internationally agreed institutional arrangements. Such an 
imaginary implies that an equitable and inclusive distribution 
of benefits is not only possible, but also that it can be rolled out 
unproblematically and without conflict across various scales 
of implementation, enabling the fabled win-wins of REDD+ 
(Jagger et al. 2009).
However, using an intimacy-geopolitics frame (Pain 2015) 
this paper has argued that below the superficial yet ominous 
peace of the Sungai Lamandau REDD+ project, were processes 
of slippery violence—an intimate ‘green war’ exacerbating 
exclusion of the already marginalised. Those excluded rarely 
disappeared quietly. Many countered their exclusion with 
violence—sometimes with emancipatory effect, sometimes 
with environmentally destructive outcomes. 
All too often, intimate spaces and bodies are either 
rendered invisible or are characterised as the disconnected, 
passive victims of national and global processes of REDD+ 
implementation (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014; Dowler 
et al. 2014). REDD+ interventions conceal policy façades which 
measure success according to outputs without acknowledging 
violent processes of spatial marginalisation (Biddulph 2011). 
By thinking about the production of violence through an 
intimacy-geopolitics frame, this paper has sought to shake 
the conventional approaches to space and scale that reinforce 
these invisibilities. Intimate violence(s) and geopolitical 
violence(s) are inextricably linked and indistinguishable 
(Pain and Staeheli 2014). Sites of violent exclusion included 
kitchens, river-side huts, and rice fields as much as police 
stations, government offices, and guard posts. The violence 
in question was rooted within histories of struggle. Political 
memories instituted the ‘rightness’ of exclusive claims to 
Slippery Violence and REDD+ / 145
things. How those excluded from REDD+ benefits resisted 
further marginalisation was also shaped by political memories, 
affecting what they deemed possible. As Gramsci puts it, before 
coming into existence, new possibilities must ideally be active 
in the minds of those struggling for change (Gramsci 1985).
Enclosures of space for carbon forestry, as well as the imposition 
of market enterprises, alternative livelihoods, and incentives for 
pro-environmental behaviours, were wrapped up in symbolic 
renderings of Sungai Lamandau’s small-holders as ‘forest 
destroyers’ requiring less destructive pastimes. This construction 
of imaginaries featuring native woods gardened by native 
small-holders met with significant covert yet environmentally 
destructive counter-violence, heavily undermining the project’s 
forest protection goals. The project’s goals deserve suspicion, 
because the rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques 
they employed attempted to formulate violence as a meaningless 
or barbarous practice situated ‘out there’ among the destructive 
and unruly ‘beneficiaries’.
Using the concept of slippery violence, this paper has 
tried to make sense of things by understanding violence as 
encompassing all processes that assault basic human freedoms 
and individual and/or collective survival (Scheper-Hughes 
and Bourgois 2004). The paper has explored the grey zones 
of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. On many 
occasions, exclusion of social intimates resulted in unintended 
consequences. The inequitable benefit arrangements often 
resulted in the realisation of ‘lose-lose’ scenarios—losses for 
the local environment, the global climate, and the security of 
livelihoods. Yet, the conditions under which dispossessions 
took place were not an inevitable outcome of any social 
development. It took intervention through violence to exclude 
people from common land and transform people into wage 
labourers.
Violence and exclusionary processes are not inevitable 
facets of land and resource management in Indonesia. Yet, 
as the findings in this paper show, adversarial relationships 
were encouraged through a market-based REDD+ that relied 
on well-defined property rights. Even in cases where land 
tenure was secure and risk of dispossession minimal, such 
market-based undertakings presented a tendency toward 
exclusionary management practices. More equitable solutions, 
which support marginalised people, will undoubtedly 
require collaboration and recommoning of resources. Until 
then, REDD+ and similar carbon-forestry projects will 
not only continue to fail in addressing the root causes of 
anthropogenic climate change, but will also continue to be 
highly exclusive—disproportionately impacting women and 
other already marginalised groups.
NOTES
1. In 2012, annual primary forest loss in Indonesia was estimated to 
be higher than in Brazil (0.84 Mha and 0.46 Mha, respectively) 
(Margono et al. 2014).
2. Žižek exemplifies this with the hunger strikes of Mahatma 
Gandhi in protest of the British colonial occupation of India.
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